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DNS Redirection and how it will break things

There's some hot debate around the implications and rightness of service providers to do things like traffic filtering, session hijacking, etc.

I'm not here to talk about that. The data below aims to focus on the technical failures induced by dns hijacking, or dns redirection. I won't bore you with the moral, political, or philosophical discussion around this topic.

Here's a summary if you don't want to read the details:

  • DNSBLs probably don't work anymore for Comcast users
  • Owned domains (semicomplete.com, google.com, etc) are also subject to hijacking. Domain owners cannot opt-out.
  • Down dns servers may result in full-domain hijacking by Comcast (due to dns search suffix and retry behavior)
  • Privacy/security/cookie leak due to domain hijacking
  • There is an IETF draft to formalize/standarize this destructive behavior that ignores consequences and impact, and neglects important points.
  • Sometimes Domain Helper malfunctions and steals valid hostnames, like www.google.com: screenshot here ; or a video
  • Web browsers aren't the only things using DNS.

All of the samples below are real data I observed while digging into this issue. They are not faked.

Comcast recently finished rolling out their new Domain Helper software. This tool intercepts responses from other DNS servers and replaces them with forged responses that point to comcast's search portal. It currently modifies responses that indicate 'no such hostname'; in DNS this response is called NXDOMAIN.

For example, if you try to visit 'http://www.someinvalidhost12345.com', it doesn't exist, and the DNS 'NXDOMAIN' response saying so is dropped and replaced with an A record pointing to Comcast's search site:

% host http://www.someinvalidhost12345.com
http://www.someinvalidhost12345.com has address 208.68.139.38
The domain helper documentation explains how it works, but incorrectly describes behavior and doesn't describe the consequences of the new behavior. From the docs, it sounds something "must" (per above) include "www". This is false, and is likely just out-of-date documentation, as the documentation goes on to explain that they "will eventually phase in the following pattern matches to enhance this service in the future." This probably explains why valid invalid.valid hostnames are bounced to comcast, and why invalid TLDs are bounced to comcast:
% host -t A abcdefghijklmnopww12345678.semicomplete.com
abcdefghijklmnopww12345678.semicomplete.com has address 208.68.139.38

% host -t A www.dns.is.broken
www.dns.is.broken has address 208.68.139.38
Simply having 'ww' is sufficient, even for valid domains like mine or totally invalid TLDs like 'broken'. Every NXDOMAIN is subject to hijacking. The IP address above is still comcast's search redirector.

So, what is the hard technical impact of this change?

DNSBLs may be broken

DNSBL is 'dns blacklist', check wikipedia for detail. Wikipedia says this about how DNSBLs are used:
Look up this name in the DNS as a domain name ("A" record). This will return either an address, indicating that the client is listed; or an "NXDOMAIN" ("No such domain") code, indicating that the client is not.
% host -t A 111.0.168.192.bl.spamcannibal.org
111.0.168.192.bl.spamcannibal.org.home has address 208.68.139.38
% host -t A 111.111.11.11.zen.spamhaus.org
111.111.11.11.zen.spamhaus.org.home has address 208.68.139.38

According to DNSBL de facto behavior, I should probably get NXDOMAIN given it's unlikely these IPs are in DNSBLs. Alternately, many DNSBLs reply with a special '127.0.0.xxx' address to indicate what the status of the address is if it is in the list. The responses above are neither, but are Comcast's search domain.

A Comcast employee on twitter pointed out that DNSBLs are only used by mail servers. Fine, we don't run mail servers on Comcast residental, but there are mail clients that support DNSBL for local spam filtering (thunderbird may, evolution appears to). The point is, DNSBL is not purely for 'mail servers', meaning this feature breaks DNSBL for clients.

I don't have data about how many people use DNSBL on mail clients. Point is, it's an option not limited to mail servers.

Down DNS servers are fully hijacked

When a DNS server is down, your DNS request generally times out and you get a SERVFAIL response. What happens when your local DNS client gets a SERVFAIL, though?

DNS resolvers support 'search suffixes'. In linux, you see this in /etc/resolv.conf as 'search some list of domains'. At my house, I have a 'home' dns zone managed automatically by my ddwrt router. This means I have 'search home' in my resolver.

If I try doing a dns query for 'some-invalid-host.something.com' and get NXDOMAIN or SERVFAIL, my resolver will try adding a suffix, if it's configured to do so. Here's an example of a dns server not responding and yielding SERVFAIL and the resolver's attempt to try with a suffix 'home' resulting in comcast NXDOMAIN hijacking me:

% host -t A wwwdead.evilcouncil.org 68.87.76.182
Using domain server:
Name: 68.87.76.182
Address: 68.87.76.182#53
Aliases:

wwwdead.evilcouncil.org.home has address 208.68.139.38

Sniffing my local network traffic with tshark during this lookup:
6.755838 192.168.0.97 -> 68.87.76.182 DNS Standard query A wwwdead.evilcouncil.org
6.770844 68.87.76.182 -> 192.168.0.97 DNS Standard query response, Server failure
6.771264 192.168.0.97 -> 68.87.76.182 DNS Standard query A wwwdead.evilcouncil.org.home
6.799348 68.87.76.182 -> 192.168.0.97 DNS Standard query response A 208.68.139.38
Interesting. Here's another data point:
% ping hijackmyww.evilcouncil.org
PING hijackmyww.evilcouncil.org.home (208.68.139.38) 56(84) bytes of data.
^C
Notice comcast's search portal IP repeated again and again...

If we use comcast's default search suffix for my area, hsd1.ca.comcast.net, what happens?; 'www.example.com' may SERVFAIL, then we retry as www.example.com.hsd1.ca.comcast.net, which comes back as comcast's search2.comcast.net, again, due to their NXDOMAIN intercept.

Now, any SERVFAIL may automatically direct you to through their 'dns helper' search redirect.

Security issues

The last issue is something I noticed last night while disconnecting my VPN to work. I had our monitoring site up in my browser - this page autorefreshes itself every few minutes. After disconnecting, it refreshed, and dumped me at search2.comcast.net.

Since the redirect happens in DNS, the browser will believe that you are still talking to the same server (by name) and will share cookies and http authentication freely. What happens if you visit 'www.mail.google.com' in Firefox? Let's look at the network:

snack(~) % sudo ngrep . 'port 80 and host 208.68.139.38'
[sudo] password for jls:
interface: eth0 (192.168.0.0/255.255.255.0)
filter: (ip or ip6) and ( port 80 and host 208.68.139.38 )
match: .
####
T 192.168.0.97:44422 -> 208.68.139.38:80 [AP]
  GET / HTTP/1.1..Host: www.mail.google.com..User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686 (x86_64); en-US; rv:1.9.1.3) Gecko/20090824 Firefo
  x/3.5.3..Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8..Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5..Accept-Encoding: gzip,
  deflate..Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7..Keep-Alive: 300..Connection: keep-alive..Cookie: PREF=ID=0cc23ef3118faec6:U=fffb...
The above shows Firefox sending Comcast my google mail login cookie. Had I been visiting a page that uses basic HTTP authentication, my username and password would've been sent, too.

Sure, cookies have a 'secure' attribute which tells the browser to only send them over SSL connections, but does everyone use them? Nope. Bank of America, for example, doesn't set this flag, which is a security issue itself, but is leaked to Comcast on typoed URLs or during 'domain helper' malfunctions.

Firefox has no idea that 'www.mail.google.com' isn't Google, or www1234.bankofamerica.com isn't Bank of America, and a normal user won't have any idea they just leaked their credentials, private session info, and other cookie data.

Domain Helper Malfunction

Ofcourse, the worst part of this whole system is when the hijacking itself misbehaves, and you get 'www.google.com' hijacked, when it's a real hostname.

Defenses and Actions

How can we prevent some or all of this? Contact your ISP, help them understand the impact of this behavior. Pushing at least to allow domain owners to opt-out of the domain redirection might be a start or to require that providers not hijack owned domains. Not hijacking invalid TLDs would be good too, given the common usage of 'corp' and others as an intranet TLD.

If you are a comcast user and want to opt-out of Comcast's Domain Helper, you can visit dns-opt-out.comcast.net (requires login, only works when viewed from comcast). Alternately, you can point your local dns caches at comcast's non-domain-helper servers